Copart, Inc. (CPRT)

Executive Summary / Key Takeaways

• The Duopoly That Prints Money: Copart and IAA control roughly 80% of the U.S. salvage auction market, but Copart's two-decade head start as an exclusively online platform (since 2003) and its owned-yard model generate 34% net margins and 18% ROE that its primary competitor cannot match, creating a self-reinforcing liquidity advantage that gets stronger with scale.

• Cyclical vs. Secular Tug-of-War: While rising uninsured motorists (a cyclical response to insurance rate hikes) temporarily suppressed Q1 FY26 insurance volumes by 8.4%, this headwind masks the unstoppable secular driver: total loss frequency hit an all-time high of 23.8% in Q4 FY25 and management believes it will inevitably reach 25-30% as vehicle complexity and repair costs continue their upward march, guaranteeing long-term volume growth.

• Capital Allocation Excellence Meets Valuation Reality: With $5.2 billion in cash, zero debt, and a management team that has repurchased shares aggressively during past pullbacks, Copart trades at 23.9x earnings—near historical lows despite delivering all-time high ASPs for insurance carriers and expanding operating margins by 200 basis points to 39.4% in Q1 FY26.

• The Non-Insurance Flywheel Is Accelerating: Blue Car (bank/fleet) grew 15.3% in FY25, Purple Wave's GTV expanded 9.4%, and Title Express now processes over 1 million titles annually—each initiative deepens customer relationships while leveraging the same auction liquidity, creating higher-margin revenue streams that diversify beyond insurance cyclicality.

• The Critical Variable: The investment thesis hinges on whether management can continue converting purchased units to higher-margin consignment models while maintaining auction liquidity during the current soft insurance volume environment—any deterioration in gross returns per unit would signal moat erosion, while continued ASP growth despite volume headwinds confirms pricing power.

Setting the Scene: The Salvage Auction Utility

Copart, incorporated in 1982 and headquartered in Dallas, Texas, operates what is effectively a critical infrastructure utility for the automotive ecosystem—one that becomes more essential as vehicles grow more complex and expensive to repair. The company provides online auction services for total-loss vehicles, serving primarily insurance companies but increasingly banks, rental fleets, dealers, and individual consumers. Its business model is elegantly simple in concept yet brutally difficult to replicate: provide the digital marketplace and physical storage infrastructure that connects vehicle sellers with a global buyer base of over 300,000 registered members, then capture value through consignment fees and ancillary services.

This is not a traditional auction house. Copart's Virtual Bidding Third Generation (VB3) technology, implemented across all facilities between 2004-2008, created the first exclusively online salvage auction platform nearly two decades before competitors were forced to digitize during COVID-19. The shift to online eliminated geographical constraints, creating a global bidding pool that fundamentally altered the supply-demand equation. A damaged Tesla in Florida can now attract bids from rebuilders in Ukraine, exporters in Nigeria, and parts dismantlers in Mexico simultaneously. This global liquidity directly translates to higher average selling prices (ASPs), which is why insurance carriers continue to entrust Copart with their total-loss vehicles despite having other options.

The industry structure is a practical duopoly in the U.S., with Copart and IAA (owned by RB Global (RBA)) controlling the vast majority of salvage auctions. However, the competitive dynamics are not symmetrical. While IAA operates largely on leased facilities and adopted online auctions reactively, Copart's owned-yard model and proprietary technology create a cost structure advantage that compounds over time. The company has spent decades acquiring and permitting storage facilities—most recently the 400-acre Hall Ranch in South Florida—creating a physical moat that is nearly impossible to replicate in today's regulatory environment. Storage represents the bottleneck in salvage processing, and owning facilities eliminates lease expense while providing strategic capacity for catastrophic events like hurricanes, which generate massive vehicle volumes that Copart can capture while competitors turn away business.

The broader market drivers are unambiguously favorable. Total loss frequency—the percentage of accident-damaged vehicles declared uneconomical to repair—has risen from 4% in 1980 to 22.6% in 2025, driven by three irreversible trends: (1) vehicle complexity (ADAS sensors, EV batteries, integrated electronics) makes repairs prohibitively expensive; (2) rising labor rates and parts costs compress repair margins; and (3) global demand for U.S. salvage vehicles creates higher auction returns that make totaling more attractive to insurers. This is the secular engine that will drive Copart's growth for decades, even as cyclical factors like insurance coverage rates create temporary noise.

Technology, Products, and Strategic Differentiation: The Liquidity Flywheel

Copart's competitive advantage is not a single technology but a self-reinforcing flywheel built on auction liquidity. Management articulates this through five core indicators, each with direct financial implications. First, pure sale auctions (where vehicles sell to the highest bidder with no reserve) now comprise a "strong super majority" of insurance units, up from a "strong majority" in 2022. Pure sales maximize price discovery and signal true market confidence—insurers only agree to no-reserve auctions when they trust the liquidity will deliver fair value, which directly drives the 8.4% ASP increase in Q1 FY26.

Second, international buyers account for approximately 40% of vehicles sold but nearly half of auction proceeds because they purchase higher-value units. In 2026, international buyers paid 38% more than domestic buyers for comparable vehicles. This global demand layer is irreplaceable—no regional competitor can replicate Copart's 20-year accumulation of exporter relationships, customs expertise, and cross-border payment infrastructure. Even during U.S. economic softness, global buyers provide a demand floor that stabilizes ASPs and insulates Copart from domestic cyclicality.

Third, unique bidders per auction have grown steadily since 2022 to all-time highs, while preliminary bids per lot have also increased. This is the network effect in action: more sellers attract more buyers, which attracts more sellers. The financial consequence is visible in gross returns (selling price divided by pre-accident value), which have increased substantially since 2022 and are now at an "all-time high watermark" for management's ten-year tenure. When returns to sellers increase, insurers have no incentive to disintermediate Copart or shift volume to competitors, locking in market share.

Fourth, the company's technology investments extend beyond the auction itself. Copart 360 provides 360-degree vehicle imaging, IntelliSeller uses AI to help insurers make auction decisions, and Title Express processes over 1 million titles annually. Title Express reduces cycle times by 9% in the U.S., which means faster inventory turnover, higher facility utilization, and lower storage costs. More importantly, it builds trust—no carrier that has adopted Title Express has taken it back in-house, signaling that Copart is becoming an embedded workflow partner rather than just a vendor. This positions the company to capture more sub-services over time, expanding revenue per relationship.

Finally, the owned-yard model creates a structural cost advantage that competitors cannot match. While others pay rising lease rates, Copart's facility costs per unit are contained, enabling the 184 basis point gross margin expansion to 46.5% in Q1 FY26 despite volume headwinds. The Hall Ranch acquisition demonstrates forward-thinking capacity planning—400 acres in South Florida provides storage for a storm three times larger than any in Copart's history, ensuring the company can capture catastrophic volume that would overwhelm competitors. This is not just operational excellence; it's a strategic commitment to being the industry's backstop, which strengthens insurer relationships and justifies premium pricing.

Financial Performance & Segment Dynamics: Margin Expansion Despite Volume Headwinds

Copart's Q1 FY26 results tell a story of pricing power triumphing over cyclical weakness. Consolidated revenue grew just 0.7% year-over-year to $1.16 billion, but excluding the one-time impact of Hurricanes Helene and Milton in the prior year, growth was 2.9%. More importantly, global insurance units declined 8.4% while ASPs increased 6.8%—a dynamic that reveals the true health of the business. Copart's value proposition is not volume-dependent; the company can grow revenue and expand margins even when accident frequency is soft, as long as auction liquidity drives higher per-unit returns.

The segment breakdown illuminates the strategy's execution. The U.S. segment generated $952.6 million in revenue (flat year-over-year) but expanded operating margins by nearly 200 basis points to 39.4%. This margin expansion occurred because fee revenue per unit increased 7.5%, driven by the 8.4% ASP increase. Copart is capturing more value per vehicle, offsetting volume declines through pricing power rooted in superior auction returns. When insurers achieve all-time high watermarks on their salvage recoveries, they have no incentive to negotiate lower fees—Copart's take rate is justified by the net outcome delivered to clients.

The International segment tells a different but equally important story. Revenue increased 1.6% to $202.4 million, but service revenues grew 7.9% while vehicle sales declined 9.4%. This reflects a deliberate strategic shift: German insurance customers are migrating from purchase contracts (where Copart buys vehicles outright) to consignment models (where Copart earns fees). Consignment is higher-margin and better aligns incentives—Copart only profits when the insurer profits, eliminating the adversarial relationship inherent in purchase contracts. The 13% gross profit growth in International, despite flat volumes, proves this transition is accretive. Over time, as more international markets adopt consignment, segment margins should approach U.S. levels, providing a multi-year earnings tailwind.

The non-insurance wholesale business is the hidden growth engine. While global non-insurance units declined 1.5% in Q1 FY26, this was entirely due to the "Direct Buy" shift—where low-value units move from Copart's balance sheet to a referral-fee model. Normalizing for this, U.S. purchased units actually grew 6.2% and dealer unit sales increased 5.3%. Blue Car, serving banks and fleets, grew double-digits across those categories. The non-insurance market exceeds 15 million cars a year, 5x Copart's current volume. As rising total loss frequency pushes more repairable vehicles through Copart's platform, the buyer base naturally expands to include rental companies and financial institutions, creating a flywheel where insurance liquidity attracts commercial sellers, which attracts more buyers, which improves returns for all. This diversification reduces dependence on insurance cyclicality while leveraging the same fixed-cost infrastructure.

Cash flow generation remains exceptional. Q1 FY26 operating cash flow was $535.3 million, up from the prior year, with free cash flow of $427.2 million. The company ended the quarter with $5.2 billion in cash and no debt, giving it $6.5 billion in total liquidity. This fortress balance sheet enables counter-cyclical investment—while competitors retrench, Copart can acquire land, expand facilities, and invest in technology to deepen its moat. Management's statement that they are "always scouring the world for opportunities" and that cash "doesn't alter our M&A strategy" signals disciplined capital allocation. The absence of share repurchases in Q1 suggests management believes the stock is fairly valued or prefers to keep dry powder for strategic acquisitions, a prudent stance given the current volume environment.

Outlook, Management Guidance, and Execution Risk

Management's commentary reveals high conviction in the secular thesis despite near-term cyclical noise. Jeff Liaw explicitly states, "we'll reach 25% and we'll reach 30%" total loss frequency, viewing the current 22.6% level as a waypoint, not a ceiling. This confidence stems from three observable trends: vehicle complexity increasing repair costs, parts inflation from tariffs and supply chain disruptions, and global demand for U.S. salvage vehicles. The current volume softness represents temporary noise rather than structural deterioration, suggesting patient investors will be rewarded when cyclical forces reverse.

The company's storm season preparation demonstrates operational excellence. The Hall Ranch acquisition provides nearly 400 acres in South Florida, enough capacity for a storm three times larger than any in Copart's history. Management notes that "most would expect, based on above-average oceanic temperatures, that this storm season could well be an active one as well, perhaps as active as 2024." Catastrophic events generate step-function volume increases that stress competitors' capacity constraints. By pre-positioning storage, Copart ensures it can capture this volume, strengthening insurer relationships and generating high-margin revenue that flows directly to the bottom line. This is not speculative—Hurricanes Helene and Milton contributed to the volume surge in FY25, and the company is now even better prepared.

On tariffs, management's "neutral to modestly positive" assessment is nuanced and credible. Inbound tariffs increase repair parts costs, making total loss more attractive (positive volume impact). They also increase pre-accident values, which could raise indemnity costs (negative frequency impact), but simultaneously increase salvage selling prices (positive ASP impact). The net effect is likely favorable because Copart's international buyers come from Eastern Europe, Middle East, and Africa—countries unlikely to face retaliatory automotive tariffs. Management has stress-tested the scenario and concluded that tariffs accelerate the secular trend toward total loss, while competitors may be caught off-guard by parts cost inflation. This is a classic example of how Copart's global diversification insulates it from protectionist policies that hurt domestic-focused players.

The non-insurance growth strategy is explicitly described as "early innings." Management is investing in sales force expansion to capture share of the 15+ million unit wholesale market, while Purple Wave's 10% GTV growth outpaces a soft heavy equipment market. Copart's moat is transferable—the same auction liquidity that dominates salvage can win in adjacent markets. Success here would diversify revenue away from insurance cyclicality and provide a second multi-year growth vector, justifying premium valuation multiples.

Risks and Asymmetries: What Could Break the Thesis

The Department of Justice investigation into potential money laundering violations represents the most significant unquantifiable risk. The company received a letter in October 2023 indicating potential exposure and is cooperating, but "is unable to predict the duration, scope, or result." Any finding of systemic compliance failures could result in fines, operational restrictions, or reputational damage that impairs insurer trust. While management has not disclosed the investigation's focus, the fact that it persists suggests materiality. Investors should monitor for any escalation, as this is the one risk that could permanently impair the moat.

Customer concentration remains a structural vulnerability. While no single customer exceeds 10% of revenue, the company depends on a limited number of major vehicle sellers, and "the absence of long-term contractual commitments" means volume can shift quickly. The current 8.4% insurance volume decline partly reflects "market share evolution among insurance carriers" and carriers optimizing for "growth profitability." If a major insurer shifts volume to IAA or develops direct-disposition channels, Copart's fixed-cost infrastructure would face deleverage, compressing margins. The mitigating factor is that rising total loss frequency and Copart's superior returns create switching costs—insurers would sacrifice salvage recoveries by leaving, making defection less likely.

The cyclical increase in uninsured and underinsured motorists is a genuine headwind. Management acknowledges this is "a modest offset to the growth in our insurance business" and notes the trend is cyclical, having occurred during the 2009 financial crisis as well. The relationship between miles driven (which remain robust) and insurance claims is breaking down—consumers are dropping coverage despite driving, creating a structural gap in Copart's addressable market. While management expects this to "reverse over time," the timing is uncertain and depends on insurance affordability, which is pressured by inflation and regulatory rate approvals. A prolonged period of elevated uninsured rates could suppress volume growth below historical trends, forcing the company to rely even more on ASP increases and non-insurance expansion to meet investor expectations.

Competitive pressure, while muted, is evolving. RB Global's IAA integration could yield synergies that improve its cost structure, while ACV Auctions (ACVA)'s 16% revenue growth in wholesale digital auctions suggests technology barriers are lowering. Copart's moat is not impenetrable. If a competitor replicates the global buyer network or if insurers develop proprietary disposition platforms, Copart's pricing power could erode. The mitigating factor is that Copart's land ownership and 20-year technology lead create switching costs that pure-play digital competitors cannot match—physical storage is essential for salvage, and building a global buyer network takes decades.

Execution risk in capital allocation is subtle but present. Management holds $5.2 billion in cash and has not repurchased shares in Q1 FY26, suggesting either discipline or uncertainty about intrinsic value. Excess cash earning Treasury yields is suboptimal for shareholders. If management cannot deploy capital into accretive acquisitions or organic growth, the cash becomes a drag on ROE. The risk is that management becomes too conservative, missing opportunities to consolidate the fragmented international markets or adjacent equipment auction spaces while competitors gain scale.

Valuation Context: Premium for Quality, but Not Excessive

At $38.98 per share, Copart trades at 23.9x trailing earnings and 8.1x sales, with an enterprise value of $32.6 billion (16.5x EBITDA). These multiples are premium to the market but near historical lows for the company, particularly given the 34% profit margins and 18% ROE. The market is pricing in the current cyclical volume weakness while undervaluing the secular durability of the moat.

Peer comparisons highlight Copart's exceptional quality. RB Global (RBA) trades at 46.8x earnings with 9.7% profit margins and 0.75x debt-to-equity, while KAR Auctions (KAR) trades at 29.2x earnings with 9% margins and 0.93x leverage. Copart's net cash position, superior margins, and higher ROE justify a valuation premium, yet its P/E is lower than RBA's. Given Copart's superior technology, cost structure, and growth prospects in non-insurance, Copart appears undervalued relative to its duopoly partner.

The company's capital structure is pristine: $5.2 billion in cash, no debt, and a $1.25 billion undrawn revolver. This provides $6.5 billion in total liquidity, representing 17% of the market cap. It eliminates financial risk and provides optionality. In a downturn, Copart can acquire distressed competitors or accelerate land purchases. In an upturn, it can fund catastrophic event response without tapping capital markets. The absence of a dividend since 1994 and the $326 million remaining share repurchase authorization signal that management views reinvestment as superior to capital return, a stance that makes sense given the 18% ROE and expanding TAM.

Free cash flow yield is 3.7% ($1.23 billion FCF on $37.7 billion market cap), which is modest but growing. The key metric is FCF conversion: operating cash flow of $1.8 billion on $1.55 billion net income demonstrates high earnings quality. The business is not capital-intensive despite the land ownership—maintenance capex is low, and growth investments generate immediate returns. This supports the thesis that Copart can compound capital at high rates for years without external funding.

Conclusion: The Moat Is Intact, the Cycle Will Turn

Copart's investment thesis rests on a simple but powerful premise: auction liquidity is a durable competitive advantage in a market where total loss frequency must rise due to irreversible trends in vehicle complexity and global demand. The current cyclical headwind from uninsured motorists is real and explains the 8.4% insurance volume decline, but it is temporary. History shows insurance penetration is cyclical, and the underlying drivers—rising repair costs, ADAS sensor proliferation, and emerging market demand for U.S. salvage—are accelerating. Management's confidence that total loss frequency will reach 25-30% is not speculation; it is arithmetic based on these trends.

The financial results validate the moat's resilience. Despite volume softness, Copart expanded gross margins by 184 basis points and operating margins by 200 basis points in Q1 FY26, driven by 6.8% ASP growth and the strategic shift to consignment models. The non-insurance business is growing faster than core insurance, Purple Wave is gaining share in heavy equipment, and Title Express is reducing cycle times while deepening insurer relationships. These are not defensive moves; they are offensive expansions of the addressable market.

The key variables to monitor are gross returns per unit and the pace of consignment model adoption. If ASP growth continues despite volume declines, the moat is widening. If international markets follow Germany's lead in shifting to consignment, segment margins will inflect higher. The DOJ investigation remains a wild card, but the balance sheet provides ample cushion for any potential settlement.

At 23.9x earnings with net cash and an 18% ROE, Copart offers a rare combination of quality, growth, and reasonable valuation. The cyclical headwinds will reverse, the secular tailwinds will persist, and the auction liquidity moat will continue compounding. For patient investors, the current volume softness is an opportunity to own a structural winner at a cyclical discount.