Energy Transfer LP (ET)

Executive Summary / Key Takeaways

• Energy Transfer has quietly built the most direct exposure to the AI-driven natural gas demand surge, contracting over 6 Bcf/day of pipeline capacity to data centers and power plants with 18+ year terms and $25 billion in firm fees, transforming its earnings profile from commodity-exposed to utility-like contracted cash flows.

• The partnership's capital discipline has sharpened materially, reducing 2025 growth capex by 8% to $4.6 billion while maintaining a $5 billion 2026 pipeline, with all major projects (Desert Southwest, Hugh Brinson, Bethel storage) delivering mid-teen returns and 6x EBITDA multiples that rival the best in midstream.

• Q3 2025 results show a strategic pivot in progress: intrastate optimization profits are declining by design as ET shifts to long-term third-party contracts, creating near-term EBITDA headwinds ($99 million quarterly decline) but building a decade-plus revenue foundation that eliminates volatility.

• The Sunoco LP (SUN) rollup strategy—culminating in the Parkland (PKI) acquisition—creates the largest independent fuel distributor in the Americas, adding defensive, retail-oriented cash flows that diversify ET away from pure commodity exposure while maintaining midstream integration benefits.

• Two litigation overhangs remain material but manageable: Dakota Access Pipeline's FERC process (Final EIS expected December 2025) and Rover's $40 million proposed penalty (indemnified by contractors), both representing headline risk rather than existential threat given ET's 3.24x leverage ratio and $11.5 billion annual operating cash flow.

Setting the Scene: From East Texas Pipeline to AI Infrastructure Backbone

Energy Transfer LP, founded in 1996 with a single 10-inch idle pipeline in East Texas under Kelcy Warren's leadership, has executed one of the most ambitious build-and-buy strategies in midstream history. Today, the partnership operates approximately 140,000 miles of pipeline across 44 states, making it the most diversified energy infrastructure company in the United States. This isn't mere scale for scale's sake—it's a deliberately integrated network that can gather natural gas at the wellhead, process it into NGLs, transport it across state lines, store it in massive underground caverns, and deliver it to export terminals, refineries, or directly to end users.

The business model generates revenue through three primary mechanisms: fee-based transportation and storage (the most stable), commodity-based optimization and marketing (historically volatile but profitable), and integrated processing and fractionation (linking upstream production to downstream demand). This diversification matters because it allows ET to capture value across the entire hydrocarbon value chain while insulating itself from any single commodity's price swings. When natural gas prices collapse, NGL margins might expand; when crude volumes decline, refined product distribution might surge.

ET's strategic positioning has shifted dramatically in the past 24 months. The partnership has moved aggressively to capture what management calls "demand-pull" customers—data centers, power plants, and LNG facilities that need reliable, long-term natural gas supply rather than opportunistic spot market purchases. This pivot addresses the fundamental question facing every midstream investor: in an energy transition world, who will buy the molecules? ET's answer is that AI compute, not traditional industrial demand, will drive the next decade of gas consumption growth.

Technology, Assets, and Strategic Differentiation: The Network Effect Moat

ET's competitive advantage rests on three interlocking pillars that become more valuable as they expand: geographic density in the Permian Basin, integrated processing and transport capacity, and strategic storage assets. The Permian footprint matters because it's the only U.S. basin that can meaningfully increase production to meet growing demand. ET's gathering systems, processing plants, and intrastate pipelines in West Texas create a closed loop where the partnership controls molecules from the wellhead to the market, capturing multiple fee streams on the same volume.

The processing plant expansion illustrates this integration value. Lenorah II and Badger (200 MMcf/day each) are now in service, with Mustang Draw (275 MMcf/day) arriving Q2 2026 and Mustang Draw II (250 MMcf/day) approved for Q4 2026. Why does this matter? Every MMcf of gas processed generates NGLs that must be transported on ET's Lone Star Express Pipeline to its Mont Belvieu fractionators, then potentially exported from its Nederland terminal. This vertical integration means ET captures 4-5 separate fees on the same molecule, creating margin stacking that single-asset competitors cannot replicate.

Storage assets represent the most underappreciated moat. The Bethel natural gas storage facility expansion will double working capacity to over 12 Bcf by late 2028, with potential for 15 Bcf additional. Management's view that storage value will "skyrocket" reflects a structural shift: as 30 Bcf/day of new LNG export capacity comes online by 2030, the Gulf Coast will need massive buffer storage to manage supply disruptions from hurricanes or facility outages. ET's 50+ MMBbls of NGL storage and expanding gas storage create a natural monopoly—regulators won't approve new salt caverns near population centers, and the geology is finite. This scarcity value will command premium rates during volatility spikes.

The NGL export infrastructure at Nederland and Marcus Hook demonstrates ET's terminal moat. The Flexport expansion added ethane and propane service in Q2 2025, with ethylene export starting Q4 2025, and over 95% of capacity is contracted through decade-end. The ninth Mont Belvieu fractionator (165,000 bpd) coming online Q4 2026 will push total capacity above 1.3 million bpd. These assets are irreplaceable—permitting a new Gulf Coast export terminal today would take a decade and face insurmountable environmental opposition. ET's first-mover advantage locks in long-term contracts with petrochemical customers who have no alternative.

Financial Performance: The Contract Quality Transformation

Q3 2025's $3.84 billion adjusted EBITDA, down from $3.96 billion year-over-year, appears disappointing at first glance. But the composition reveals a deliberate strategic shift. The intrastate segment's $99 million quarterly EBITDA decline stemmed from "lower optimization volumes with shifts to long-term third-party contracts from the Permian and narrower price spreads." This is management sacrificing volatile, spread-dependent profits for stable, decade-long transportation fees. Transported volumes on Texas intrastate pipelines actually increased, but the revenue mix shifted from high-margin optimization to lower-margin but infinitely more predictable base fees.

The midstream segment's $65 million decline similarly reflects a one-time $70 million business interruption claim in Q3 2024. Excluding this, EBITDA rose on 17% Permian volume growth from plant upgrades and WTG assets acquired in July 2024. This indicates the core gathering and processing business is accelerating, masked by non-recurring items. For the nine months, midstream EBITDA increased $239 million driven by $393 million from acquired assets and higher Permian volumes, plus a $160 million Winter Storm Uri recognition. The underlying trend is strong.

Interstate transportation provides the clearest growth signal. Despite a $43 million one-time ad valorem tax charge on Rover, segment EBITDA would have increased on higher contracted volumes and utilization. For the nine months, EBITDA rose $78 million on $116 million higher segment margin, including $63 million from higher transportation revenue. This segment is fully contracted with investment-grade counterparties on 25-year terms—it's a bond-like annuity growing with demand-pull customers.

The crude oil segment's $22 million quarterly decline reflects refinery turnaround impacts on Bakken and Bayou Bridge pipelines that have since completed. More importantly, ET is filling this capacity through creative solutions: the Price River Terminal expansion ($75 million, Q4 2026) doubles Uinta oil export capacity, while Enbridge (ENB) partnerships will bring 350,000 bpd of Canadian crude onto Dakota Access and ETCOP pipelines under 15-year agreements extending into the 2040s. This transforms underutilized assets into long-term cash generators.

Sunoco LP's $33 million quarterly EBITDA increase and $383 million nine-month jump demonstrate the rollup strategy's power. The NuStar (NS) acquisition added gathering and transportation fees to traditional fuel distribution, while the Parkland acquisition (closed October 2025) creates the largest independent fuel distributor in the Americas. This vertical integration gives ET a guaranteed offtake for its refined products pipelines and terminals, reducing third-party dependency.

Outlook: The AI Gas Supercycle Meets Capital Discipline

Management's 2025 adjusted EBITDA guidance of "slightly below the lower end" of $16.1-16.5 billion reflects conservatism, not weakness. The $400 million range represents less than 2.5% variance at the midpoint, showing high confidence in a $16+ billion base. The key insight is that 2025 is a transition year—most growth project earnings hit in 2026-2027. The Flexport contracts kick in January 2026, Hugh Brinson Phase 1 starts Q4 2026, and Desert Southwest begins Q4 2029. This creates a visible earnings ramp that the market hasn't priced.

The data center opportunity quantifies the supercycle. ET has contracted over 6 Bcf/day with demand-pull customers in the last year alone, with a weighted average life exceeding 18 years and $25 billion in firm fees. The Oracle (ORCL) agreements for 900,000 Mcf/day to three data centers, Fermi America's 300,000 MMBtu/day hypergrid campus , and Entergy Louisiana's (ETR) 250,000 MMBtu/day 20-year deal represent just the beginning. Management is evaluating 150 data center prospects in Texas alone, with most within miles of existing pipelines. The capital required is minimal—"5 miles of pipe" to connect 400,000-500,000 MMBtu/day flows—creating incremental returns that exceed mid-teens thresholds.

Desert Southwest exemplifies project quality. The 1.5 Bcf/day, 516-mile pipeline is fully contracted for 25 years with investment-grade counterparties, including a 400,000 MMBtu/day commitment from a new demand source. Management is evaluating expansion to 2.0-2.5 Bcf/day due to "significant interest." At a 6x EBITDA multiple and mid-teens returns, this $3+ billion investment will generate $500+ million annual EBITDA for decades. The project leverages existing Transwestern Pipeline rights-of-way, reducing permitting risk and capital intensity.

Hugh Brinson Phase 1's 1.5 Bcf/day capacity is "completely sold out" by Q4 2026, with Phase 2 compression making the system bidirectional at 2.2 Bcf/day west-to-east and 1 Bcf/day east-to-west. Management calls it "the most profitable asset we've ever built" because it connects Permian supply to Gulf Coast LNG, Texas data centers, and Southeast markets through a single main artery. Over 90% of ET's 3.8 million MMBtu/day Texas cross-haul capacity is contracted through 2036 with demand charges, creating a regional monopoly on directional gas flows.

The Lake Charles LNG project, while not yet at FID, demonstrates capital discipline. Management refuses to proceed until 80% equity partners are secured, targeting 20% ET ownership versus 100% initially. With 10.4 million tons of offtake negotiated and discussions for 30% equity stake with MidOcean Energy, the project could add 3-4 million tons of LNG export capacity (roughly 0.4-0.5 Bcf/day equivalent) with minimal ET capital. The focus remains on the pipeline transportation business—ET's core competency—rather than taking full commodity price risk.

Risks and Asymmetries: What Could Break the Thesis

The Dakota Access Pipeline litigation represents the most visible risk. The USACE's Final EIS expected December 2025 and Record of Decision in early 2026 could theoretically lead to shutdown, but management's confidence—"we expect that after the law and complete record are fully considered, any such proceeding will be resolved in a manner that will allow the pipeline to continue to operate"—reflects legal precedent and the pipeline's continuous operation through six years of challenges. The asymmetry is favorable: downside is limited to legal costs and headline risk, while upside includes 15-year Canadian crude contracts that fill available capacity into the 2040s.

The Rover Pipeline FERC proceeding, with $40 million in proposed civil penalties, is largely mitigated. The primary contractor and subcontractor have agreed to indemnify Rover for losses, including fines. While ET cannot "provide an assessment of the potential outcome," the indemnity agreement and management's intent to "vigorously defend" suggest minimal financial impact. The risk is reputational, not balance-sheet threatening.

Execution risk on $4.6 billion of 2025 growth capex is real but manageable. ET's leverage ratio of 3.24x is well within covenant compliance, and $11.5 billion of annual operating cash flow provides 2.5x coverage of growth spending. The risk isn't funding—it's project delays or cost overruns. However, ET's track record of on-time, on-budget delivery (TITAN vehicles, Flexport expansion) and experienced management team (Mackie McCrea, Tom Long) mitigate this concern. The ability to defer projects like Mustang Draw "if we see a huge downturn" provides flexibility.

Commodity price volatility remains a headwind. The intrastate segment's $237 million nine-month EBITDA decline from reduced optimization reflects narrower spreads and lower volatility. This is structural—ET is deliberately sacrificing this income for contract stability. The risk is that optimization profits don't just decline but disappear entirely in a low-volatility environment. However, the offset is that data center and LNG demand creates a new volatility source: supply disruption risk that makes storage assets like Bethel exponentially more valuable.

Regulatory risk has shifted positive. The "One Big Beautiful Bill Act" reinstating 100% bonus depreciation and the new administration's "streamlined processes" reduce project costs and timeline uncertainty. The FERC's 1% liquids index reduction is immaterial compared to the benefit of faster permitting. This regulatory tailwind is underappreciated and reduces the discount rate investors should apply to long-dated project cash flows.

Valuation Context: The Quality Discount That Shouldn't Exist

At $16.71 per share, ET trades at an enterprise value of $117.77 billion, or 7.95x TTM EBITDA. This multiple is substantially below all major peers: Enterprise Products (EPD) (11.10x), Kinder Morgan (KMI) (13.62x), Williams (WMB) (16.25x), and ONEOK (OKE) (10.63x). The discount reflects historical concerns about commodity exposure, complex structure, and execution missteps. But the business model transformation—shifting from optimization to 18-year contracted revenue—warrants a re-rating toward peer averages.

The 7.96% distribution yield, while attractive, comes with a 104.4% payout ratio that initially appears concerning. However, this is a GAAP metric that includes non-cash items. ET's distributable cash flow (DCF) coverage is more relevant: with $7.34 billion of annual free cash flow and distributions likely around $6 billion (based on 3-5% growth from prior levels), coverage is approximately 1.2x. The partnership targets 3-5% distribution growth as a "floor to long-term growth in distributable cash flow per unit," explicitly stating they won't "manufacture distribution growth by getting into coverage." This discipline supports sustainability.

Price-to-operating cash flow of 5.29x is exceptionally low for a business converting to contracted cash flows. For context, KMI trades at 10.60x and WMB at 13.43x. ET's lower multiple suggests the market still prices it as a cyclical commodity play rather than a stable infrastructure utility. The debt-to-equity ratio of 1.36x is moderate for midstream and well-covered by EBITDA, with no near-term refinancing risk given $3.44 billion available on the five-year credit facility.

The key valuation asymmetry: if ET achieves its 2026 EBITDA ramp from Flexport, Hugh Brinson, and Permian plants, EBITDA could approach $17-18 billion. At a conservative 10x multiple (still below peers), enterprise value would reach $170-180 billion, implying 45-55% upside from current levels. The market is pricing ET as if the data center supercycle and project backlog don't exist.

Conclusion: A Quality Transformation Masked by Transition Noise

Energy Transfer is executing a strategic pivot that the market has yet to recognize. The partnership is sacrificing short-term optimization profits to lock in 18-year contracts with data centers and power plants, creating a visible $25 billion revenue backlog that transforms the earnings quality from cyclical to contractual. This shift, combined with capital discipline that reduced 2025 capex while maintaining mid-teens project returns, positions ET as a lower-risk, higher-quality business than its historical reputation suggests.

The AI gas supercycle is not a speculative future—it's a present reality with 6 Bcf/day already contracted and 150 data center prospects in Texas alone. Projects like Desert Southwest and Hugh Brinson aren't growth bets; they're fully contracted annuities with investment-grade counterparties that will generate cash flows into the 2040s. The market's 7.95x EBITDA multiple reflects the old ET, not the emerging infrastructure utility that has become the preferred gas supplier to the digital economy.

The investment thesis hinges on two variables: execution of the $5 billion 2026 capex program without cost overruns, and successful resolution of the DAPL FERC process without operational disruption. Both risks are manageable given ET's track record and cash flow generation. If management delivers on its project backlog and the market re-rates ET toward peer multiples of 10-11x EBITDA, the combination of distribution yield and capital appreciation offers compelling total return. The quality transformation is underway; the stock price simply hasn't caught up.